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Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4487
Income inequality in Latin America ranks among the 
highest in the world.  It can be traced back to the unequal 
distribution of assets (especially land and education) 
in the region. But the extent to which asset inequality 
translates into income inequality depends on the 
redistributive capacity of the state. This paper documents 
the performance of Latin American fiscal systems from 
the perspective of income redistribution using newly-
available information on the incidence of taxes and 
transfers across the region. The findings indicate that: 
(i) the differences in income inequality before taxes and 
transfers between Latin America and Western Europe are 
This paper—a product of the Growth and the Macroeconomics Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to understand the effects of fiscal policy. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at hlopez@worldbank.org.  
much more modest than those after taxes and transfers; 
(ii) the key reason is that, in contrast with industrial 
countries, in most Latin American countries the fiscal 
system is of little help in reducing income inequality; and 
(iii) in countries where fiscal redistribution is significant, 
it is achieved mostly through transfers rather than taxes. 
These facts stress the need for fiscal reforms across the 
region to further the goal of social equity. However, 
different countries need to place different relative 
emphasis on raising tax collection, restructuring the tax 
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According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2006, Latin America 
ranks at the top among world regions in terms of inequality, second only to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Inequality in Latin America is pervasive – it extends to every aspect of life, from 
the distribution of income and assets to access to education and health services, and 
political voice and influence.   
 
High inequality is viewed by many as intrinsically bad on moral and ethical 
grounds.
1 But in addition high inequality can be a powerful drag on development and 
prosperity, for several reasons.  First, for given average income levels, higher income 
inequality means higher poverty. And the magnitude of this effect is far from negligible: 
according to Perry et al. (2006), if Latin America had the levels of inequality found in 
developed countries, its current poverty rate would be more than halved. High poverty is 
not only a tragedy in itself but, as a rapidly expanding literature has argued, it can also be 
a source of underdevelopment traps in which financial market imperfections and 
institutional constraints prevent the poor from contributing to the growth process.
2  This 
in turn retards growth and makes poverty self-perpetuating. Indeed, the international 
evidence is consistent with this growth-deterring effect of poverty (e.g., López and 
Servén 2006b).  
 
Second, the other side of the coin is that higher inequality also weakens the 
impact of aggregate income growth on poverty: the more unequal income distribution is, 
the faster the rate of growth required to achieve a given reduction in poverty.
3 Combined 
with the mechanism described above, the result is that inequality lies at the core of the 
vicious circles of stagnation and poverty in which many developing countries appear to 
be stuck. 
 
Third, high inequality can also be a source of distributive conflict and social 
tension, which tend to undermine the legitimacy of policies and institutions as well as 




These considerations have brought social equity to center stage in the Latin 
American policy debate. Indeed, recent major contributions to that debate portray social 
equity as one, or even the, key organizing principle for the region’s development strategy, 
and some retrospective assessments of Latin America’s performance under the so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’ of the 1990s blame the reforms’ neglect of equity 
considerations for the region’s limited achievements over the last decade.
5 On both 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2006) for a review of the philosophical arguments for equity.  
2 See for example Azariadis and Stachurski  (2005). 
3 See Bourguignon (2004) and López and Servén (2006a) for some quantitative estimates of the order of 
magnitude of this effect. 
4 Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) present empirical evidence of the adverse effect 
of inequality on investment through these channels. 
5 Among major recent contributions see Birdsall and de la Torre (2001), Kuczynski and Williamson (2003), 
De Ferranti et al (2004) and Perry et al (2006). 
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counts, equity has become a central concern for development policy across the region, 
echoing the views of Latin American citizens, who overwhelmingly perceive the 
distribution of income as ‘unfair’ or ‘very unfair’ and believe that the state should take 
responsibility for reducing the gap between rich and poor.
 6  
 
High income inequality usually reflects an unequal distribution of assets, such as 
land and human capital, which prevents important segments of the population from 
participating in the growth process. Across countries, asset inequality and income 
inequality are closely associated – e.g., the cross-country correlation between the Gini 
coefficients of the distribution of income and the distribution of years of schooling is 
above .75, while the correlation between the Gini indices of the distribution of income 
and the distribution of land is around .50 (de Ferranti et al.,  2004). And asset distribution 
is highly unequal in Latin America. For example, the Gini coefficient of the distribution 
of operational holdings of agricultural land is about .81 for Latin America (Deininger and 
Olinto, 2000), while in other world regions it hovers around .60; similarly, for the 




But high inequality can also reflect the failure of fiscal policy to perform its 
redistributive function – one of Musgrave’s (1959) three classic fiscal functions
8 – 
through appropriate use of taxes and transfers to correct socially-undesirable distributive 
outcomes arising from market forces, given the prevailing distribution of assets. The 
evidence shows that industrial-country governments are highly effective at this 
redistributive function, but developing-country governments are not, and in fact they are 
often part of the problem rather than the solution.
 9   
 
If inequality is above socially tolerable levels, as the survey evidence cited above 
suggests, in general policy action has to take a dual approach. On the one hand, it should 
target the deep roots of inequality, through interventions aiming to broaden asset 
ownership and equality of opportunity – e.g., by expanding access to education and 
health. But this is likely to be a long-term process with much of the payoff accruing in the 
distant future. On the other hand, policy should ensure, through the necessary fiscal 
reforms, that the fiscal system performs its redistributive function effectively. Of course, 
the relative emphasis on each of these courses of action should depend on country-
specific circumstances.  
                                                 
6 According to the regional opinion poll Latinobarometro, 89 percent of those surveyed in 2001 regarded 
the distribution of income in their countries as unfair or very unfair. In an earlier 1996 poll, three-quarters 
of all respondents agreed strongly with the view that the state should take charge of reducing inequality, 
and a further 17 percent supported that view, but not “strongly”. 
7 Asset inequality has deep roots in Latin America, which some authors (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000 and 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) trace to the pattern of specialization during colonial times, 
heavily reliant on natural resources – especially mining and sugar production – and on the use of 
subordinate labor. In this view, the colonists developed institutions (related, for example, to land use and 
political control) that helped perpetuate their political dominance and their wealth, resulting in a highly 
unequal distribution of assets that has persisted until today.  . 
8 The other two are efficiency and stabilization; see Musgrave (1959). 
9 For a discussion of the anti-poverty effect of taxes and transfers in industrial countries see Smeeding 
(2006). For a comparison of industrial and developing countries see Chu et al. (2000). 
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In this paper we document the performance of Latin American fiscal systems 
from the perspective of redistribution. Using recently-assembled data on the incidence of 
taxes and transfers in major Latin American countries, we place the region against the 
comparative benchmark provided by industrial countries. This serves to highlight two key 
facts. First, the biggest contrast between the two regions in terms of income inequality 
concerns the distributional impact of the tax and transfer system. In contrast with 
industrial countries, in most Latin American countries the fiscal system is of little help in 
reducing inequality. This is the combined result of two adverse factors. One is that 
transfers do help redistribution, but not much. The other is that the scope for active fiscal 
redistribution is severely constrained by the region’s low levels of tax collection, which 
(with a couple of exceptions) are well below the international norm – a fact that also 
underlies the shortcomings of Latin America’s public sectors in the other classic 
functions of efficiency and stability.  
 
Second, the bulk of redistribution in industrial countries is achieved through 
transfers, rather than taxes. This has important policy implications for the debate on the 
type of taxes (income or VAT) that policy makers should consider in the context of fiscal 
reforms that have among their objectives an increase in tax collection. 
 
On the whole, the evidence we present shows ample room for enhancing the 
distributive performance of Latin America’s fiscal systems through appropriate fiscal 
reform – with specific reform priorities determined by country circumstances. Our 
analysis is subject to some caveats, however. First, we focus on the distribution of annual 
income, rather than that of lifetime income, which would be impossible to study with the 
available data. This in turn implies that we ignore the potential dynamic distributive 
effects arising from social expenditures such as health and education. These might affect 
asset accumulation by the poor and hence have an impact of the distribution of future 
market income. Second, our use of European countries as benchmark of comparison is 
also a reflection of data availability rather than a normative statement about the 
desirability (or lack thereof) of the ‘European model’ as a specific choice between 
redistributive activism and efficiency costs. Related to this, we do not discuss the 
institutional and implementation challenges that Latin American countries might face 
should they wish to expand significantly the role of taxes and/or transfers as 
redistributive vehicles.
10 Third, we rely on standard incidence analysis, leaving aside 
incentive effects of fiscal interventions whose proper analysis would require empirical 
implementation of a fully-specified general equilibrium model.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we compare the 
distributional impact of taxes and transfers in Latin America and in Europe. Section 3 
explores in detail why Latin America’s fiscal policy is largely ineffective at reducing 
income inequality. The section reviews the three key ingredients of fiscal redistribution -- 
                                                 
10 See for example Dethier (2007) for a discussion of the difficulties that developing countries would likely 
encounter if they tried to raise social security coverage to levels similar to those found in the developed 
world. 
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the tax/transfer collection level, the incidence of the tax burden, and the distribution of 
transfer benefits. Finally, Section 4 closes with some concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Income inequality and fiscal redistribution in Latin America 
 
We begin by reviewing the facts regarding income inequality and the 
redistributive performance of the fiscal system in Latin America. Before proceeding, it 
will be useful to define some terms. We use the term market income to refer to income 
before taxes and government transfers – thus its distribution is largely determined by 
market rewards to the private assets and efforts of individuals, and by the underlying 
distribution of those private assets. However, from a welfare perspective a more relevant 
measure is disposable income – i.e., household income after government cash benefits 
(e.g. pensions, unemployment insurance, social assistance transfers) have been received 
and direct taxes have been paid. Note that disposable income, rather than market income, 
is the relevant measure of the purchasing power of the different households. Two 
additional definitions used below are gross income (market income plus government cash 
benefits, or total household income before taxes) and post-tax income, which deducts 
from gross income all taxes, direct and indirect. This latter measure is useful to get a 
more comprehensive view of the tax burden, particularly in countries that rely heavily on 
indirect taxation.   
 
Comparing these various income concepts, we can assess the distributional impact 
of the tax and transfer system and its separate components. It is important to clarify the 
limitations of this type of analysis. First, taxes and transfers may themselves affect the 
distribution of market income, a fact whose proper consideration would require a fully 
specified behavioral model, which is beyond the scope of our analysis.
11 Second, we 
focus on annual income, thus neglecting intertemporal issues (such as redistribution over 
the life-cycle), which may lead to overstating inequality as well as the regressivity of 
indirect taxation (Fullerton and Rogers 1993). Third, we focus on cash transfers only, and 
thus we do not assess the redistributive effects of transfers in kind like public health, 
education, or housing.
12 And fourth, our discussion of the incidence of transfers on 
income inequality focuses on who benefits from spending on average, rather than at the 
margin,  and thus we ignore possible systematic differences between average and 
marginal incidence – which could lead us to underestimate the redistributive impact of 
transfer increases.  
 
With these caveats in mind, Figure 1 reports the value of the Gini coefficient of 
the distributions of disposable income (Panels A and B) and market income (Panels C 
and D) in Latin America (Panels A and C) and Europe (Panels B and D).
13  Inspection of 
                                                 
11 An example of that approach is Fullerton and Rogers (1993). 
12 Transfers in kind can also have a direct redistributive effect, but its quantitative assessment poses a 
number of difficulties. For example, one needs to make assumptions regarding how accurately the cost of 
the public good acquired by these transfers reflects its value for the private individuals receiving it. To 
avoid these complications, here we have limited our attention to the incidence of cash transfers only. 
13 The Latin American data underlying Figure 2.1 come from two main sources. Tax incidence information 
is derived from  Breceda et al. (2006) for Argentina (1997), Brazil (1999), Colombia (2003), Mexico 
(2002), Peru (2004), Bolivia (2004), Honduras (2004) and Nicaragua (2001).  Chile’s tax incidence was 
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Panels A and B clearly illustrates the fact that Latin America is much more unequal than 
Europe.
14 In fact, the Latin American country with the lowest Gini coefficient in this 








Panel A. Latin America Panel B. Europe











































































































































































































































































































































However, the situation is dramatically different when we look at Panels C and D, 
which depict the Gini coefficients of the distribution of market (i.e., pre-tax and transfer) 
incomes. In fact, whereas the average Gini coefficient of market income for the Latin 
America sample, at .52, is only 2 percentage points above that of disposable income, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
drawn from Engel et al. (1999). The incidence of transfers is estimated on the basis of the information in 
Lindert et al. (2006). The European data come from EUROMOD, which is a source of harmonized 
microdata on the different income components before and after redistribution; see 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/mu/emodstats/index.htm 
14 The graphs confirm the findings of De Ferranti et al. (2004) and World Bank (2006). For disposable 
income, they report an average Gini coefficient of about .5 for Latin America and an average Gini 
coefficient of .31 for European countries. 
15 This result continues to hold in a broader sample of Latin American countries, because the lowest Gini in 
the region (Uruguay’s) is .42. 
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Gini coefficients of the European countries are substantially higher than those in Panel B:  
the average for the 15 countries in the sample is now .46. That is, it appears that most of 
the difference between the levels of disposable income inequality in the two regions is 
due to the different impact of taxes and transfers: they reduce market income inequality 
considerably in Europe, and very little in Latin America.  
 
Note that before direct taxes and transfers are considered there are many countries 
in Europe that have Gini indices comparable to those typically found in Latin America. 
This is the case, for example, with the Gini coefficients of market income for Ireland and 
the UK, estimated at .53 and .52. Even the Nordic countries, popularly praised for their 
levels of equality, show high inequality in market incomes. The Gini indices of Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden are .49, .49 and .45 respectively. The most equal countries in terms 
of market incomes are Austria and the Netherlands, with Gini coefficients of .38 and .39 
respectively. Of course, this is in sharp contrast with Panel B, where the Gini coefficients 
are on average 15 percentage points lower. This difference is even larger in the cases of 
Denmark or Ireland, where taxes and transfers lower the Gini coefficient by 20 and 19 
percentage points respectively. It is worth noting that even the countries that redistribute 
the least through the tax-benefit system (Italy, Greece and Portugal) still manage to lower 
the Gini index by more than 10 percentage points. 
 
The dramatically different impact of the tax-benefit system in Latin America and 
Europe is also apparent from Figure 2, which separates the respective impacts of cash 
transfers and direct taxes. Panel B shows that in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the UK, and 
Sweden public transfers lower the Gini coefficient of market incomes by 12-14 
percentage points, and by 10-11 percentage points in Belgium, Germany, and 
Luxemburg. At the other extreme, in Portugal transfers lower the Gini coefficient by just 
6 percentage points. The average contribution of transfers for the European sample is 
around 10 percentage points. In contrast, public transfers contribute only slightly to lower 
inequality in Latin America, lowering the Gini coefficient by between 1 and 2 percentage 
points, although in some cases (Peru) the distribution of income is even more unequal 
after transfers than before transfers. 
 
As for taxes, the situation (depicted in panels C and D of Figure 2) is similar but 
the contrast between regions is less dramatic. Like with transfers, taxes reduce the levels 
of income inequality much more in European countries than in Latin America. For 
example, direct taxation lowers the Gini coefficient of household income by 6-7 
percentage points in Austria, Belgium, and Luxemburg, and by an average 5 percentage 
points for the fifteen countries in the European sample.  In contrast, the average decline 
in the Latin American Gini coefficients as a result of direct taxes is about 1 percentage 
point, with very little variation across countries.    
 
One additional message from Figure 2 regards the relative redistributive roles of 
direct taxes and transfer benefits. For the European countries, transfers play a more 
significant role than taxes: of the 15 percentage points difference between the average 
Gini coefficients of market and disposable income across European countries, about two-
thirds (10 percentage points) are due to transfers.  
  6 
Figure 2. The role of taxes and transfers in Latin America and Europe 
Difference between Gini coefficients of gross income and market income
Panel A. Latin America Panel B. Europe
Panel C. Latin America Panel D. Europe






































































































































































































































































































































Table 1 The role of indirect taxes in the UK  
(Gini coefficients) 
Market Gross Disposable Post-tax
This Study 0.52 0.39 0.34
Jones (2006) 0.52 0.37 0.34 0.38
Income Definition
 
              Source: Tables 1 and 2 and Jones (2006)  
 
Importantly, our definition of disposable income only deducts direct taxes, which 
in general tend to be more progressive than the overall tax package comprising both 
direct and indirect taxes.  In this regard, Jones (2006) performs calculations similar to 
ours for the UK using 2003-04 data and extending the analysis to consider also the role of 
indirect taxation. As shown in Table 1, the conclusion is that indirect taxes increase the 
Gini coefficient of post-tax income (household income after transfers have been received 
and both direct and indirect taxes paid) by about 4 percentage points above that of 
disposable income, thus more than offsetting the progressive impact of direct taxes. That 
  7 




In other words, the differences between the distributions of market and disposable 
income (such as those implied by Figure 1 above) likely overstate the redistributive role 
of the state, because they ignore the usually regressive impact of indirect taxes. Panel A 
of Figure 3 offers estimates of that impact for Latin American countries. It is indeed 
uniformly regressive, although smaller in magnitude than that found by Jones (2006) for 
the UK. Panel B compares the Gini coefficients of post-tax and market income for the 
same countries. Thus, it offers an encompassing view of fiscal redistribution, including 
the effects of both direct and indirect taxes as well as transfers. It shows that, with the 
exception of Peru, the combination of direct and indirect taxes and transfers contributes 
to lower inequality levels in all countries shown. As a result of fiscal policy, the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of post-tax income is, on average, 1.5 percentage points 
lower than that of market income. The difference is particularly large in the case of 
Colombia, where it reaches 4 percentage points. 
 
 
Figure 3. The role of indirect taxes in Latin America 
(change in Gini coefficients) 



































































































3. What limits fiscal redistribution in Latin America? 
 
To summarize, the empirical evidence suggests that taxes and transfers exert a 
much more significant redistributive impact in Europe than in Latin America. But why 
exactly? Intuitively, one could argue that this is so because in Europe taxes are higher 
(and therefore can finance more transfers), and/or are more progressive (at least when we 
consider direct taxes), and/or transfers are better targeted towards the needy. But to assess 
reform priorities, we need to know what relative role each of these ingredients plays in 
shaping fiscal redistribution in Latin America. 
                                                 
16 Similar results have been found for the United States. For example, Pechman (1985, 1990) analyzed the 
structure of the tax burden in the US concluding that the tax system has very little effect on the distribution 
of income. However, he also found that the system of transfer payments is highly progressive and has a 
major effect on the income distribution. 
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3.1 A simplified framework 
 
In fact, the respective contribution of each ingredient can be assessed making use 
of a simple expression that relates the Gini coefficient of disposable income ( ),the 
Gini coefficient of market income ( ), the level of taxation (
d G
m G τ ), and the distribution 




md GG GG ) θ τ τ −= +  .       ( 1 )  
 
We can view the left-hand side of the equation as the redistributive impact of the 
fiscal system – given by the difference between the degree of inequality of market 




This expression shows that the redistributive impact of the fiscal system is 
proportional to the tax effort.  In other words, even if benefits are well targeted towards 
the poor and the tax system is very progressive, countries with low tax efforts will end up 
with a distribution of disposable income quite similar to that of market income.  
 
This is better seen if we simplify the previous expression by assuming 
proportional tax rates (i.e.  ) so that rearranging we can write:   τ G G
m =
 
θ τ τ G G G
m d − − = ) 1 ( .       ( 2 )  
 
As the level of taxationτ  declines, the Gini coefficient of disposable income 
approaches that of market income. To put this another way, the level of taxation 
determines how much of a given increase in market income inequality translates into an 
increase in the inequality of disposable income. Thus with an effective tax rate of 50 
percent, an increase of 5 percentage points of the Gini coefficient of market income will 
translate into an increase of 2.5 points in that of disposable income. At the other extreme, 
with an effective tax rate of 10 percent, the effect on the Gini coefficient of disposable 
income rises to 4.5 points.  
 
Given the tax effort, the more progressive the structure of taxation, the bigger the 
redistributive role of the state. What matters here is the Gini coefficient of tax payments, 
which will generally depend on the tax structure (a policy variable) and on the underlying 
distribution of market incomes (a given for policy makers, at least in the near term). 
                                                 
θ G
17 See Engel et al. (1999). In order to derive this expression one needs to assume that tax revenues are fully 
directed towards cash transfers, that transfer benefits are progressive -- in the sense that lower percentiles of 
the income distribution receive larger shares of total transfers than higher percentiles (so that a larger value 
of the Gini coefficient of transfers   implies more progressivity), and that taxes are also progressive, so 
that the amount paid by richer percentiles is also higher than the amount paid by lower percentiles. Note 
that this latter assumption does not necessarily require progressive effective tax rates.  
18 If only direct taxes are considered, G
d refers to disposable income. If both direct and indirect taxes are 
taken into account, then G
d should be interpreted as referring to post-tax income. 
  9 
Thus, in order to understand the redistributive potential of changes in the tax structure, it 
is critical to know how they affect 
19
τ G   
 
Likewise, given the tax effort, the more progressive the transfer system, as 
measured by  , the bigger the redistributive fiscal impact. The role of policy 
complementarities is clear in this context. For example,   appears in the equations 




20In other words, if transfers are very low, improvements in their targeting have 
only a negligible impact on inequality.  Similarly, the impact of changes in the tax effort 
on the distribution of disposable income depends on the targeting of transfers and on the 
progressivity of the tax system. If targeting is bad and taxes regressive, increases in tax 
collection are of no help to reduce inequality. 
 
We next assess how Latin America fares in each of these three areas. 
 
3.2 Tax collection 
 
As just discussed, the first determinant of fiscal redistribution is the overall 
volume of tax collection, which sets an upper bound on redistributive and other 
expenditures.
21  This raises the question of whether Latin America’s tax revenues are too 
low to permit adequate redistribution on the expenditure side. Of course, there is no such 
a thing as an optimal level of taxation that applies to all countries in all circumstances, 
and in setting the level of taxes countries have to trade off the excess burden of taxation 
against the social value of the public goods and services (such as education or 
infrastructure) and/or the distributional changes to be funded with them. These costs and 
benefits are likely to be affected by a variety of country-specific factors. 
 
Tax collection has been on the rise in Latin America in recent years. Since the 
early 1990s it has grown by an average of 2-3 percent of GDP. But in spite of the rising 
trend, collection volumes remain well short of the international norm. Figure 4 shows that 
almost all Latin American countries lie below the regression line relating tax collection to 
the level of development, as measured by per capita GDP. Indeed, the median country in 




                                                 
θ
19 Lopez and Serven (2006c) calibrate a simple fiscal model for Europe and conclude that to reduce the 
Gini coefficient of market incomes by 1 percentage through changes in the tax structure only, it would be 
necessary to more than double the ratio of the effective tax rates of the top and bottom deciles (from 4 to 
about 9), a fairly radical change.  
20 If this assumption were relaxed, G  would be interacted with the total level of transfers instead. 
21 Indeed, in accordance with the analytical discussion, the data for European countries reviewed earlier 
reveals a positive association between tax collection and the magnitude of the state’s redistributive impact, 
as measured by the difference between the Gini coefficients of the distributions of market and disposable 
income. 
22 A similar result is obtained by Perry et al (2006) when they relate average collection during the 1990s 
(rather than in 2000) to per capita GDP. 
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Why is tax collection so low in Latin America? Conceptually, there are two 
possible reasons: low statutory tax rates, and narrow tax bases. Of course, each of the two 
may play differently for different taxes. Table 2 offers a comparative perspective on tax 
rates across world regions, for both income and value added taxes. Latin America’s 
income tax rates are at the low end of the spectrum, for both personal and corporate 
income. Indeed, income tax rates have declined across the region over the last two 
decades. The average top personal income tax rate fell from 49.5 percent in 1985 to about 
30 percent in 2004. Likewise, the average top corporate tax rate declined from 43.9 
percent in 1986 to 26.6 percent in 2004 (Gómez-Sabaini 2005). As for VAT rates, they 
have followed the opposite trend: the regional average of countries’ general rates rose 
from 12 percent in 1992 to 15 percent in 2004 (Gómez-Sabaini 2005).  Still, Table 2 
shows that they are not high by international standards.  
 
Table 2 Comparative perspective on Tax Rates 
Personal Corporate VAT
East Asia Pacific 33.50 31.50 10.00
Latin America and the Caribbean 29.00 26.60 15.00
Middle East & North Africa 48.00 40.00 17.00
OECD 45.00 35.00 17.25
South Asia 39.50 41.00 15.00




Source: Author’s calculations based on Eichhorn (2006), WDI 2006, OECD tax Database,  
Doing Business Database. Figures refer to last available date. 
 
What about tax bases? Narrow tax bases can be the result of plain tax evasion, or 
too generous tax concessions and loopholes. One rough way of gauging tax bases is by 
looking at tax productivity, defined as actual revenues (as a percentage of GDP) relative 
  11 
to the prevailing nominal rates.
23 This exercise is reported in Table 3.  VAT 
productivity
24 is comparable in Latin America to that observed in other world regions, 
including rich countries, although the regional average conceals significant cross-country 
variation.
25 For income taxes, however, Latin America places far behind industrial 
countries, even below Sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that the problem behind Latin 
America’s low income tax receipts is primarily one of narrow tax bases rather than tax 
rates.  
 
Tax evasion is rampant across the region, although precise figures are obviously 
hard to calculate. Some recent estimates for Argentina, Brazil and Chile place evasion 
rates at 50 percent or higher in the case of the personal income tax, and around 40 percent 
for the corporate income tax.  Even for the VAT the estimates are quite large. Some 
rough calculations suggest that a 30 percent reduction in evasion would increase tax 
revenues by 17 percent in Argentina, 14 percent in Brazil and 12 percent in Chile 
(Pessino and Fenochietto, 2006). 
 
 
Table 3. Tax Collection and Tax productivity 
Income VAT Income VAT
East Asia Pacific 34.38 25.45 0.15 0.36
Latin America and the Caribbean 18.27 36.83 0.08 0.33
Middle East & North Africa 16.93 29.05 0.07 0.32
OECD 25.87 25.96 0.15 0.34
South Asia 23.02 29.61 0.05 0.18
Sub Saharan Africa 23.00 33.10 0.11 0.33
Region
Collection (% of revenue) Tax  Productivity
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Eichhorn (2006), WDI 2006, OECD tax Database, Doing Business 
Database. 
 
  The practice of tax evasion in Latin America is encouraged by weak tax 
administrations across the region. Indeed, opinion polls show that large majorities of 
individuals perceive tax collection as largely arbitrary and unfair -- only 23 percent of 
those surveyed by Latinobarómetro in 2003 thought tax collection was ‘impartial’. The 
culture of evasion is likely further promoted by the overwhelmingly negative views about 
the state’s capacity to spend wisely – in the same survey, just 15 percent of respondents 
believed that tax revenues would be put to good use. 
 
A key factor behind poor tax compliance (and hence tax collection) is informality, 
which is pervasive in Latin America. The size of the ‘shadow economy’ relative to the 
formal one is estimated to average around 40 percent, the highest figure across world 
                                                 
23 In the case of the income tax, our productivity measure is based on the top marginal rate.  
24 The calculations in the table use GDP to approximate the VAT base. Using aggregate consumption 
instead yields similar qualitative results. 
25 Across the region, VAT productivity ranges from less than 25 percent in Mexico to over 50 percent in 
Honduras (Martner and Aldunate 2006). 
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regions, equaled only by Sub-Saharan Africa.
26 Figure 5 shows that tax collection has a 
strong negative association with informality. The figure depicts the partial scatter plot of 
tax collection as percent of GDP against the estimated size of the shadow economy, after 
removing the effect of per capita income. Across Latin America, higher informality 
comes along with lower tax revenue, holding constant the level of development. 
  












































Shadow Economy (% GDP)
 
  
Informality, of course, is not exogenous, but the combined result of poor public 
services (that reduce the benefits of formality), weak tax administration, and the tax 
structure itself. Payroll taxes in particular are widely viewed as providing a major 
incentive to informality, and still account for a considerable fraction of total direct tax 
collection in Latin America – as high as 50 percent in Brazil (Martner and Aldunate 
2006). More broadly, the overall tax burden facing formal firms – combining corporate 
taxes and VAT along with payroll contributions-- is higher in Latin America than in other 
world regions, with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa,
27 and this provides small firms 
a strong incentive to remain informal. 
 
Aside from evasion, tax concessions – exemptions, deductions, and other 
loopholes – play a major role in narrowing income tax bases across Latin America. In 
many countries, households with above-average income levels are exempt from the 
personal income tax because of very high minimum personal exemption levels. The 
average level of the minimum taxable income is twice the region’s per capita income, and 
in some countries it is much higher (Figure 6).
28 High personal exemptions combined 
with a plethora of deductions severely reduce effective income tax rates, especially for 
the rich. As a result, tax rates highly progressive on paper collect little revenue in practice 
because the higher rates only kick in at extraordinarily high levels of income, so they are 
rarely, if ever, effective (Tanzi 2000). 
                                                 
26 Eichhorn (2006). 
27 See World Bank (2006). 
28 Shome (1995) reports that these minimum exemptions are higher in Latin America than in other 
developing regions. 
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          Source: Stotsky and WoldeMariam (2002). 
 
The limited collection of income taxes has prompted some experimentation with 
alternative taxes – such as gross asset taxes and taxes on financial transactions. The 
former is essentially a minimum tax, typically applied at a rate of 1 percent. While easy 
to administer and potentially effective against evasion, it is not devoid of efficiency 
problems (Gómez-Sabaini, 2005). In turn, taxes on financial transactions were originally 
introduced in several countries as emergency collection devices, but they have proven 
hard to replace and have tended to persist given their low administration cost and high 




If Latin America’s tax collection, low by international standards, effectively limits 
the room for fiscal redistribution, how much more effective could the state be in 
performing its redistributive role if tax revenues were more plentiful? We can illustrate 
the answer to this question using the conceptual framework outlined earlier to perform a 
counterfactual exercise in which we raise both overall tax collection and overall transfers 
by 2 percentage points of GDP, but maintain unaltered the incidence of taxes and 
transfers across the population – so as to isolate the distributive impact of additional 
fiscal resources.  
 
Figure 7 reports the results of these simulations. The first striking aspect is the 
large degree of heterogeneity in the country responses. For example, in Peru an increase 
of taxes and transfers is accompanied by increases of inequality, a reflection of the 
regressivity of the transfer system (in the sense that transfers contribute to higher income 
inequality). At the other extreme are Mexico and Colombia, where tax-transfer volume 
increases lead to noticeable declines in the Gini coefficient of between .5 and 1.2 
percentage points. In the other countries, tax-transfer volume increases not accompanied 
by interventions affecting their incidence have only modest distributional effects. 
                                                 
29 See Tanzi (2000).  
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3.3 Tax incidence 
 
The distributional implications of Latin America’s tax structure have been widely 
debated. On a priori grounds, the large weight of indirect taxes in the region’s total 
revenues leads to the presumption that overall taxation is likely to be regressive or neutral 
at best, given the conventional wisdom that income taxes are usually progressive while 
consumption taxes such as the VAT are not. This, of course, is not necessarily the case, 
since multiple rates for VAT and similar taxes may actually achieve some progressivity – 
at the cost of potentially significant administrative complication -- by granting more 
favorable treatment to food and other goods primarily consumed by the poor.
30 Indeed, 
most Latin American countries make use of multiple VAT rates (Gómez Sabaini, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, in a number of Latin American countries, the effective income 
tax rates of the upper income brackets are only a fraction of the statutory rates, negating 
much of the supposed progressivity of income taxes. In turn, payroll taxes are also 
usually regressive, since in most countries they are capped, so that the average rate 
declines with the level of income.  
 
The few assessments available of the incidence of taxes in Latin America tend to 
find a neutral or regressive effect. Gómez-Sabaini (2005) summarizes the findings of 
individual studies of ten Latin American countries. In eight of them the overall effect of 
the tax system is found to be regressive; in the other two it is approximately neutral. 
Those studies, however, use disparate methodologies, so that their results are not truly 
comparable across countries, and cover different time periods. 
 
 
                                                 
30 However, evidence shows that much of the benefit from reduced VAT rates accrues to the rich, due to 
their higher levels of expenditure; see Tanzi (2000) for discussion. On the other hand, the regressive effects 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: Panels on the left are expressed as percentage of total contribution of all quintiles; panels on the right are expressed as percentage of the total market income of each quintile  
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We can revisit this question using the tax incidence data introduced earlier. For 
the six Latin American countries with available data, Figure 8 reports the share of taxes 
(both direct and indirect) paid by each quintile of the income distribution, as well as the 
quintile’s effective tax rate (i.e., taxes paid relative to total income). The figure shows 
that the upper quintiles tend to pay more taxes in all cases. For example, the top quintile 
pays at least 50 percent of total taxes, and in a couple of cases (Mexico and Colombia) as 
much as 70 percent -- but this should not be a surprise given that the top quintile of the 
population also accounts for 55 to 65 percent of the income.  
 
More indicative of the tax burden is the effective tax rate that the different 
quintiles pay on their disposable income, and in this case it is apparent that poorer 
households tend to face a heavier tax burden relative to their income than those at the top 
of the distribution. The estimated incidence of the different taxes is also different. Income 
taxes are generally progressive and, in some cases (e.g., Brazil or Bolivia), highly so as 
contributions come solely from the top quintile. Value added taxes on the other hand tend 
to be regressive, as are overall taxes in most countries (as already shown in section 2). 
 
Table 4 brings together direct and indirect taxes. As already shown, income taxes 
are modestly progressive or neutral (in all countries except Brazil and Chile they tend to 
lower income inequality), while the VAT is modestly regressive in all countries. The 
table also indicates that taxation is roughly neutral overall, so that the Gini coefficients of 
post-tax income (i.e., after both direct and indirect taxes) are fairly similar to those of 
gross income.  
 
Table 4. Income inequality before and after taxation 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Average
Gini of Gross income (A) 0.49 0.54 0.46 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.50
Gini of Disposable income (B) 0.48 0.54 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.48 0.50
Gini of Post tax income (C) 0.48 0.55 0.46 0.53 0.49 0.49 0.50
(B) - (A) -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(C) - (B) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(C) - (A) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00  
 
What is the redistributive potential of a progressive change in the tax structure? 
Figure 9 reports the results of a counterfactual simulation of a hypothetical tax reform 
that for each country involves declines of 2 and 1 percent in the effective tax rate of the 
lowest and second lowest quintile, respectively, and increases of the same magnitudes in 
the effective tax rates of the highest and second highest quintiles. Tax revenue is kept 
fixed by adjusting the overall tax structure. Note that this reform is quite significant in 
terms of how the tax burden is changed. Yet, as figure 9 indicates, the estimated 
redistributive improvement is quite limited – the Gini coefficient changes by less than 
half a percentage point. This highlights the limitations of changes in the tax structure as a 
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3.4 The redistributive effects of public spending 
 
Section 2 showed that in European countries fiscal redistribution manages to 
reduce sharply the Gini coefficient of market incomes, and that public transfers account 
for the bulk of this effect. In contrast, in Latin America public transfers achieve little on 
the inequality front. There are two potential (not mutually exclusive) reasons for this 
difference. One is that the volume of transfers is much smaller in Latin America than in 
Europe. The other is that the targeting of the given volume of transfers is not very 
progressive 
 
Regarding the volume of transfers, Latin America spends, on average, less than 
half of what is spent in Europe. For example, Table 5 (based on Lindert et al. 2006) 
indicates that on average the six Latin American countries considered here devote to 
transfers about 7.3 percent of GDP. Of this total, about 6.3 percent of GDP goes to social 
insurance programs (such as pensions and unemployment insurance) and about 1 percent 
of GDP to social assistance programs such as conditional cash transfers, school meals, 
and scholarships. In contrast, Europe spends more than 16 percent of GDP on transfers, 
most of which for social insurance programs.  Table 5 also indicates that there is 
substantial heterogeneity among Latin American countries, with some high spenders 
(Argentina, and especially Brazil), some moderate spenders (Chile, Colombia) and some 
low spenders (Mexico and Peru). Thus in principle, even if these flows were targeted 
progressively, we would expect them to have much less of an impact than in Europe, 
given their smaller volume. 
 
 
Table 5. Transfers in Latin America and Europe (% of GDP) 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru LAC6 Europe
Social Insurance 7.7 11.7 6.9 5.9 2.6 3.1 6.3 14.7
Social Assistance 1.5 1.4 0.7 0.6 1 0.5 1.0 1.6
Total Transfers 9.2 13.1 7.6 6.5 3.6 3.6 7.3 16.3  
Source: Lindert et al. (2006) 
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But the problem is not only that Latin America spends relatively little on 
transfers. In addition, their targeting leaves much to be desired. Figure 10 shows the 
median incidence of social protection transfers
31 for Latin America (Panel A) and Europe 
(Panel B). In these figures, the horizontal axis measures the quintiles of the income 
distribution and the vertical axis the share of the spending estimated to flow towards the 
different quintiles. Thus, Figure 10 gives an idea of who along the income distribution 
benefits from the spending: a positive slope means that those at the top of the income 
distribution receive a larger share of the spending than those at the bottom, whereas a 
downward sloping curve means the reverse.   
 
 
Figure 10. Public transfers in Latin America and in Europe 
Incidence by income quintile 
 














Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 
 
The message that emerges from this figure is quite clear. Latin American transfers 
tend to flow overwhelmingly towards the richest quintiles.
32 In fact, the top quintile 
accounts for almost half of total transfers, and the top two quintiles combined account for 
about 70 percent. At the other extreme, the poorest quintile receives only 8 percent of 
these flows. This is in stark contrast to what we observe in Europe, where each quintile 
receives approximately 20 percent of the total -- i.e. transfers appear to be distributed 
under an almost fully egalitarian rule. 
 
Figure 11 shows the incidence of two major transfer programs: pensions and 
unemployment insurance. These two programs combined account for the bulk of social 
insurance spending in Latin America. Inspection of this figure reveals that these 
programs are regressive, especially in the case of pensions, in which the two top quintiles 
of the population attract about 80 percent of the spending. On the other hand, the bottom 
quintile receives less than 3 percent.  The biggest problem with Latin American pension 
systems from the point of view of equity is their low coverage: pension systems are far 
                                                 
i θ
31 In other words, the curves portray the empirical estimates of the   parameters introduced earlier base. 
32 Note, however, that this does not mean that regressive transfer programs are inequality-increasing. They 
still reduce inequality if their incidence is less regressive than that of pre-transfer income itself.    
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from universal, and usually exclude workers in the informal sector and in agriculture. In 
addition, some special pension schemes for public sector employees are hugely 
regressive, as they offer extremely generous benefits to a privileged few, with the bulk of 
the cost financed by taxpayers.
33 Unemployment insurance is likewise regressive, 
although less markedly so. About 65 percent of the spending goes to the top two 
quintiles, with the bottom quintile obtaining less than 10 percent of the spending. Given 
that in Latin America poor households often work in the informal sector, it is not 
surprising that they have little access to these benefits aimed at formal sector workers.
34 
 
Figure 11.  Pensions and unemployment insurance in Latin America 
Incidence by income quintile 
















This does not mean that all social programs are regressive. Indeed, there are 
programs, typically in the social assistance area, that are well targeted. Figure 12 shows 
that conditional cash transfer programs
35 are strongly progressive, with close to 75 
percent of the resources accruing to the bottom two quintiles of the population. But these 
programs are quantitatively small (as shown in table) and therefore their redistributive 




                                                 
33 For example, the deficit of Brazil’s civil service pension system, which covers only 13 percent of 
pensioners, amounts to nearly 4 percent of GDP. 
34It could be argued that social insurance programs are not financed by direct taxation but by 
‘contributions’ and therefore should be treated differently. For example, if pensions are viewed as an 
intertemporal transfer for an individual rather than as an intergeneration transfer at a point in time, the 
benefits of each household should be treated as deferred consumption. In practice, however, the link 
between contributions and benefits is tenuous at best, and the programs run sizable deficits financed by 
general taxation. Indeed,  pension subsides financed through general taxation absorb about 5 percent of 
GDP in some countries, a figure higher than total spending in social assistance and, in some cases, higher 
than public spending in education and health. 
35 These include programs such as Bolsa Escola in Brazil, Subsidio Unico Familiar and Solidario programs 
in Chile, Familias en Accion in Colombia,  and Oportunidades in Mexico. 
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Figure 12. Conditional cash transfers in Latin America 







Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 
 
In light of the preceding discussion, one may wonder what would be the potential 
gains, in terms of redistributive impact, from improving the targeting of cash transfer 
programs. To sharpen the point, we assume that the counterfactual scenario involves a 
fully egalitarian distribution of transfers, as observed in Europe (see Panel B in figure 
10), without altering their total volume. 
 
   In some cases, the assumed change in targeting is admittedly very large, as Table 
6 shows.
36  The consequences of the change are presented in Figure 13. Aside from 
Colombia, the rest of countries would see their Gini coefficient fall by between 1 
percentage point (Mexico) and 5 percentage points (Brazil). In Peru and Mexico, despite 
the large reform being simulated, the gains would be somewhat limited, because, as table 
5 indicates, the volume of transfers is quite low and therefore it offers limited potential 
for improving the distribution of income regardless of the improvements of the targeting 
– as discussed earlier.  
 
 
Table 6.  Transfers in Latin America- Incidence by income quintile (%) 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Argentina 7 12 13 23 44
B r a z i l 7 1 01 22 05 2
Chile 10 13 17 23 38
Colombia 24 17 17 17 25
Mexico 10 14 13 13 51
Peru 3 5 9 20 63
Simulation 20 20 20 20 20  
                                                 
36 For example, Table 6 indicates that in Brazil and Mexico we would need to shift 31 percent of resources 
from the top quintile: in the case of Brazil to the three lowest quintiles, and in the case of Mexico to the 
other four quintiles. More dramatically, in Peru the simulation would require redistribution of 43 percent of 
the transfers from the top quintile to the bottom three quintiles. In fact, the only countries that relatively 
close to the simulated target are Chile, and more notably Colombia where the poorest quintile receives 
more than the simulated share. 
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4. Concluding remarks  
 
Latin America’s high inequality extends to virtually all aspects of social and 
economic life, and is viewed by a large majority of the region’s citizens as deeply unjust. 
High inequality undermines the stability and legitimacy of institutions and policies, and 
represents a powerful drag on Latin America’s development prospects. These reasons put 
social equity at the top of the region’s development agenda.  
 
A close inspection of the international evidence on income inequality reveals that 
the big difference between Latin America and the more egalitarian countries of Western 
Europe lies not so much in the extent of the inequality resulting from market forces, but 
in the redistributive power of the state. To put it differently, the gap between the two 
regions in terms of income inequality is much bigger after taxes and public transfers than 
before taxes and transfers, and this implies that a good deal of Latin America’s excess 
inequality over international levels reflects the failure of the region’s fiscal systems to 
perform their redistributive functions. And the magnitude of this failure is considerable: 
while in European countries direct fiscal redistribution leads to an average reduction of 
some 15 percentage points in the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income, in Latin 
America the reduction is on average about 2 percentage points.  
 
The evidence from rich countries also shows that the bulk of the state’s 
redistributive impact is due to the effect of public transfers. They account for over two-
thirds of the overall redistributive effect. Yet this is a conservative figure, because it 
ignores the regressive impact of indirect taxes, which counteracts much of the 
progressive effects of direct taxes, so that on the whole taxes likely achieve little or no 
redistribution, and the full distributive impact of the fiscal system is due to transfers.  
 
Why does Latin America do so poorly at fiscal redistribution? The paper has 
reviewed three potential explanatory factors, namely: (i) too low a volume of resources 
gets collected and transferred; (ii) tax collection is regressive; and (iii) transfers are 
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poorly-targeted. All three are at play, to different extents in different countries, but on the 
whole the conclusion is that the prospects for significant fiscal redistribution lie mainly in 
increasing the volume of resources available for redistributive spending, and improving 
the targeting of expenditures. In contrast, even significant increases in the progressivity 
of Latin America’s tax systems – which at present appear to be roughly neutral from the 
perspective of distribution -- are likely to have only a modest effect on the distribution of 
income. In other words, from the perspective of inequality reduction, the overall volume 
of tax revenue is likely to be a more important priority than the progressivity of the 
revenue-raising system – a conclusion that echoes the experience of the European 
countries reviewed in the paper. 
 
These considerations offer some guidance for the design of reforms to make Latin 
America’s fiscal systems more conducive to equity. In general, such reforms will likely 
pose significant institutional and implementation challenges, which deserve separate 
analysis. But the evidence presented in this paper shows that the specific reform priorities 
obviously vary across countries. In some countries the top priority is to expand tax 
collection and thereby the volume of transfers. Our simulation exercises suggest that this 
may be the case for Colombia or Mexico. In most countries, there is significant scope for 
raising tax collection by reducing tax concessions and loopholes, and especially 
improving tax administration to reduce evasion, which is rampant across the region. 
 
In other places, like Brazil and Peru, the immediate concern is instead to improve 
the targeting of transfers – indeed, major programs, such as social insurance, are in some 
cases quite regressive, and their reform can make a major difference for overall 
inequality. In these circumstances, raising tax collection -- without improving the 
targeting of the spending it finances -- is unlikely to help much. 
 
Of course, making the tax system more progressive will also help everywhere, 
although in general the quantitative impact on inequality is likely to be modest. This does 
not mean that the structure of the tax system is irrelevant, but only that tax choices should 
be primarily based on the efficiency and administration costs of different taxes. For 
example, the increasing recourse to ‘quick and dirty’ forms of taxation, such as the taxes 
on financial intermediation now in place in a number of Latin American countries, may 
be a matter of concern in view of its distorting potential. Among conventional 
instruments, payroll taxes, which play a quantitatively major role in several countries, 
encourage informality and ultimately tend to detract from the revenue-raising ability of 
the overall tax system. The incidence analysis in the paper does not explore any of these 
incentive and efficiency effects, but they are undoubtedly important for tax reform.  
 
Finally, we have limited our attention to the redistributive function of the state 
through taxes and cash transfers. But there are other social spending categories like 
education and health that play a very significant role in the distribution of household 
income, not only in terms of the direct incidence of the expenditures across the income 
distribution – as transfers in kind -- but also indirectly, because they can help raise the 
human capital assets of the poor and thereby their future incomes. While few doubt the 
relevance of this indirect effect, assessing it quantitatively is problematic (e.g., among 
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other complications, one needs to assume that the cost of the public good acquired by 
these transfers correctly reflects its value for the private individuals receiving it) and so 
here we have limited our attention to the incidence of cash transfers only. Yet, the 
existing evidence (see Perry et al. 2006) indicates that in the Latin American context 
social spending in health tends to be moderately progressive whereas social spending in 
education tends to be regressive, suggesting an additional area of interest for policy 
makers concerned with income inequality.  
 
Similarly, social equity is also affected by how well the state does at performing 
its other two classic objectives of efficiency and stabilization, because ultimately this 
affects the economic opportunities available to the poor and the distribution of market 
incomes. Through these indirect channels, fiscal policy can also have a major impact on 
Latin America’s inequality. Regarding the stabilization objective of fiscal policy, for 
example, one important, contribution to social equity relates to the prevention of crises. 
Macro-financial crises are almost invariably highly regressive because the costs of their 
resolution, in the form of resource transfers to better-off investors, end up being borne by 
all taxpayers; furthermore, the poor often are the most adversely affected at times of 
crises because they lack the assets to smooth out adverse income shocks. Excessive 
public indebtedness and procyclical fiscal policies have been key factors behind the 
region’s vulnerability to crises. This means that fiscal prudence, possibly guided by 
formal fiscal rules that allow the operation of counter-cyclical policies – and particularly 
of counter-cyclical social expenditures -- is also an essential part of a fiscal agenda to 
reduce inequality in Latin America. 
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